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Abstract-This paper addresses recent experimental measurements from an IEEE 802.11 ad hoc network testbed, which indicate a strong signal strength dependence in the ability of a hidden
terminal to gain access to the radio channel. We present analytical
results investigating the ‘hidden terminal jamming’ ability of the
IEEE 802.11 DSSS physical layer. Results indicate that in a hidden terminal topology, the presence of an interfering transmission
with a signal strength marginally greater than the transmission
currently being received will result in an intolerable increase in
BER, effectivelyjamming the ongoing transmission. These results
confirm previous experimentalmeasurements which show that after a number of MAC layer timeouthetransmission periods, the
original (weaker) connection is effectively prevented from gaining
access to the channel.

I. INTRODUCTION
The continued desire for mobile, ‘anywhere, anytime’ networlung has contributed greatly to the current interest in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANET’s). The dynamic nature of a
MANET is such that hidden terminal scenario is likely to be
common. Therefore, a MAC protocol capable of overcoming
this problem needs to be employed. The IEEE 802.11 MAC
protocol potentially represents a good solution for MANET’s,
having been implemented by many manufacturers, and also
including the Request-To-Send / Clear-To-Send (RTS/CTS)
handshake to provide MAC layer protection against hidden terminal collisions.
However, recent experimental measurements [ 13 have indicated that the IEEE 802.11 [2], [ 3 ] medium access control and
physical layer protocols may be inherently susceptible to hidden terminal induced channel capture. We define ‘hidden terminal jamming’ as the phenomena where transmissions from a
hidden transmitter using a spreading code within the available
sequence set can effectively jam an ongoing hidden transmission. We investigate the hidden terminal jamming capability of
802.1 1 in an identical scenario to that employed experimentally
in [l], in an effort to explain these results.
.In this paper, we use previous results [4], [5] for a Binary
Phase Shift Keying (BPSK) modulated Direct Sequence Spread
Spectrum (DSSS) signal to investigate the impact an interfering
transmission has on the Bit Error Rate (BER) experienced by
an existing transmission for the 802.11 DSSS physical layer.
Our results indicate that the DSSS physical layer is susceptible
to jamming when hidden terminals are competing for channel
access.
IEEE 802.11 Distributed Coordinate Function (DCF) compliant modems employed in a hidden terminal ad hoc mode
have illustrated a strong signal power dependence on the abil-

0-7803-7097-1/01/$10.00 02001 IEEE

ity of contending hidden connections to gain access to a radio
channel [ 11, despite the RTSKTS handshake. Measurements
indicate that a difference of < 5 dB was sufficient to prevent
a weaker host from accessing the channel, while the stronger
host was able to achieve reliable, consistent throughput. In the
case where signal levels were equal, the channel was effectively
shared using the RTS/CTS handshake. This is contrary to expectation, as with this handshake we anticipate a reasonably
fair distribution of channel access. Anticipated sharing should
also be relatively independent of the signal strength of either
receiver (within reason) particularly given the capture ability
of the radio modem, providing some immunity to an external
noise signal.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: in Section I1 we review details of the 802.11 DSSS physical layers, in
Section I11 we present our analysis of the experimental scenario
employed in [l], with numerical results following in Section
IV. Section V concludes the paper.

11. IEEE 802.11
The original IEEE 802.11 standard [2] defines a Medium
Access (MAC) Protocol, and three distinct physical layers: an
Infra-Red physical layer (IR), and two spread spectrum layers,
one based on Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS),
and another using Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS).
The 802.11 standard was updated [ 3 ] with the addition of the
High Rate (HR) physical layer extensions. This allowed the
DSSS physical layer to operate at 5.5 Mbit/sec and 11 Mbit/sec
in addition to the original 1 and 2 Mbidsec. Further extensions
in the 5 GHz band employing Orthogonal Frequency Division
Multiplexing are also under development [6].
At the MAC layer, the Distributed Co-ordinate Function
(DCF) implements CSMA/CA, with an RTS-CTS-DATA-ACK
handshake. This scheme is able to operate in a peer-to-peer ad
hoc mode, being a fully distributed MAC protocol. There is
also an optional Point Co-ordinate Function (PCF) which implements a polling scheme, controlled by a central base station.
This approach may potentially operate quite well with hidden
terminals, though currently is unable to be employed in an ad
hoc mode. The analysis in this paper will concentrate on the
self jamming ability of the DSSS physical layer, therefore we
briefly review the properties of both the Basic and High Rate
DSSS.
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A. Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum Phy:i.icalLayer
The DSSS physical layer for 802.1 I provides 4 different bit
rates. As illustrated in Table I, each of the 4 data rates employ
a different combination of modulation technique and spreading
code to achieve the desired symbol rate, and number of bits per
symbol. The Basic Rate (BR) comprises the 1 and 2 Mbit/s
data rates, and employs a Barker spreading code with DBPSK
or DQPSK respectively. The common 11 c:hip code used by all
stations for both the I and 2 Mbit/sec physical layers is
+I,-1 ,+l,+l,-l,+l,+l ,+l,-l,-l,-l
The HR-DSSS physical layer, comprising the 5.5 and
11 Mbit/s rates, employs Complementary Code Keying
(CCK) with a spreading code of length 8, generated
by a generalised Haddamard transform (1) where 4l is
added to all code chips, 42 to all odd code chips, 43
to all odd pairs, and 4 4 to all odd quads of code
chips. In each case, the chipping rate is 11 Mchipkec.
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(1) is used to create 8 complex chips (cg to c7) with CO
transmitted first in time. For CCK 5.5 MBit/s modulation at
4 bitshymbol, 41 is encoded by data bits do and dl based on
DQPSK. Data bits d2 and d3 CCK encode the basic symbol by
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44 = d3 x T
This leads to a family of 16 distinct spreading sequences which
are used to indicate the symbol transferred.
For CCK 11 Mbit/sec modulation (at 8 bits/symbol), 41 is
again encoded by & and dl using DQPSK. Data bits (&, d3),
(d4, &),and ( d ~d7)
, are used to QPSK encode 4 2 , $3, and 4 4
respectively, as shown in Table I1
This leads to a matrix of 256 potential spreading sequences
supporting the transmission of 8 bits per symbol.
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the signal strength of each contending frame measured at the
receiver. This is a problem specific to the hidden terminal
topology, where the standard CSMNCA access mechankm is
unable to sense a transmission that may result in a collision at
the intended receiver. A successful transmission relies on the
reception of an RTS frame by the intended receiver.
Referring to Fig. 1, when hidden terminals are attempting to
communicate with a common receiver, we consider two possible collisions which may occur at the receiver:
Case I : an RTS frame from connection A collides with a
DATA frame from connection B
Case 2: an RTS frame from connection A collides with an
RTS currently under reception from connection B
In each case the eventual behaviour will be dependent on many
additional factors, including the timing of the interfering frame
arrival. and the relative signal power of both transmissions. In
case 1 the contention will be handled by the MAC protocol.
However, the measurements in [ 13 show that the stronger host
will able to capture the channel after a number of backoff periods. Even though the RTS frame is relatively small, 40 bytes
compared to several hundred for the data frame, there is a high
probability that the data frame will be corrupted by the collision if the signal energy is sufficiently high. This then provides
an opportunity for the stronger host to prevent a weaker host
from gaining access to the channel through a number of timeout and retransmission cycles. This case is further complicated
by the fact that all control messaging (RTS/CTS etc.) are transmitted at the highest common transmission rate supported by
all known nodes in the network. Thus there is the potential for
a transmission spread using the Barker sequence to collide with
a data frame spread using the CCK codes generated with (1).
In case 2, the receiver will either retain capture of the original RTS frame and return a valid CTS, or will loose both of
the frames, unable to respond with a CTS until an RTS is correctly received. The experimental results in [ 11 suggest that the
stronger host will win this contention period, and be able to
capture the channel.

FRAME
111. ERRORPROBABILITY OF RECEIVED
The results presented in [I] illustrate a distinct relationship
between the ability of a host to capture the radio channel, and
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Fig. 1. Experimental Topology

To examine the impact of an interfering transmission on the
reception of a previously acquired frame, we have investigated
the resulting BER obtained at the output of a correlation spread
spectrum receiver. The model assumes that the initial frame, y,
is currently being received, at T > T,, where T, is the time
required by the correlation receiver to acquire and achieve synchronisation with the signal, the acquisition time. An asynchronous interfering frame, z, arrives at a time TZ > T,. For
both the BR-DSSS and HR-DSSS physical layers, we determine the impact this has on the correlation receiver output BER
as a function of the relative power difference between the signals, and hence the ability of the receiver to maintain capture
of the initial frame.
Our analysis for the DSSS physical layer is based on results in [4]. The original result for the SNR experienced by
the 9th user, at the correlator output of a BPSK asynchronous
DS-CDMA receiver is given by

where K is the total number of concurrent transmissions received (including the yth frame whose BER we are investigating), No the one sided noise power spectral density, Ebl the
bit energy of the yth frame, N the sequence length, and T,,,
is the Average Interference Parameter (AIP). The AIP can be
approximated [7] as
N-1
TX,, 21

2

(6)

ICXY(l)12
l=l-N

where C x y is the aperiodic cross correlation between the two
sequences, defined as

The BER is then expressed as

BE& = Q (SNR,)

(10)

where Q is the complementary error function.
A. DSSS Basic Rate Physical Layer
The use of a single spreading code for the both basic rates
allows us to simplify (9). The aperiodic cross correlation C x y
is replaced by the autocorrelation function, C X Xfor the Barker
sequence employed. Combined with the approximation derived in [7], the final SNR expression reduces to

r.

K

where a = 480.3. This analysis assumes BPSK modulation.
The BR-DSSS PHYS employs DBPSK for the 1 Mbit/s rate,
and DQPSK for the 2 Mbit/s rate. A practical system employing differential modulation will require even higher SNR at the
receiver to achieve equivalent BER performance [8].

B. DSSS High Rate Physical Layer
Spreading codes for the high rate physical layer are generated using (1) resulting in 16 complex codes for the 5.5 Mbit/s
rate at to 4 bits per symbol, and 256 distinct complex spreading
codes for the 1 1 Mbit/s rate at 8 bits per symbol. For each rate,
we use (5) to generate an expression for the output BER.
If we again use the ratio of bit energies for the current and
interfering frame, a, and the approximations of the previous
section, we can use (9) to determine the SNR for the y th frame,
averaging this result across all sequences in the set to determine
the average probability of error.
RESULTS
IV. NUMERICAL
A. Single Inteferer

elsewhere
(71

We define the relative signal strength between the contending
frames as

6, =

Ebx

Eby

(8)

where Eb, and Eb, are the respective signal bit energies for
each frame. If we assume that the interferring frame z arrives
with a signal power 6, times greater than the current frame y,
(5) can be written as

r __

K

N-1

x=l,x#,

kl-N
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This scenario corresponds to Host 1 in Fig. 1 attempting
to send an RTS or DATA frame to Host 2, who is currently
involved in the reception of a frame from Host 3. The BER
given by (lo),(1l), and ( 5 ) has been calculated for a range of
Ebl/No values, as a function of 6,. In each of Fig. 2, 3, and
4 it is evident that the presence of the single interfering frame
from Host 1 has a detrimental impact on the BER of the frame
currently being received from Host 2.
The results for the BR-DSSS 1 and 2 Mbit/s rates are shown
in Fig. 2. With 6, = 0 dB, the interfering frame arrives with
a signal power equal to the current frame. At higher Ebl/N,
the presence of the interfering transmission will increase the
BER of the initial frame, but will still allow a high probability
of successful reception of the initial frame. In this case, both
connections will have an equal impact on the other, providing the MAC protocol with a relatively fair scenario to operate.
This result provides a strong basis for the fair channel access
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reported in [ 11 in the case where each connection had an equal
SNR measured at the receiving host.
With 6, = 5 dB, the presence of the interfering frame raises
the BER to 10-1.5, significantly reducing the probability of
successful reception of the initial frame. Again, this explains
the results in [ l ] where a 5dB difference in signal power on
the ‘stronger’ link is sufficient to prevent the weaker host from
obtaining access to the channel.
It is also possible to view the curves in reverse. If an interfering frame arrives with 6, < 0 dB, then the current frame
will suffer little increase in BER and retain a high probability
of successful reception.
The calculations for the HR-DSSS were performed by averaging the SNR as given by (5) across the entire number of
sequences in the set. This requires the calculation of the interference parameter, T , , ~for each sequence in the set. In this
case, the ‘2’sequence corresponds to the sequence currently
being received, and the ‘y’ sequence the inlerferer. The number
of codes in the set represents the number of interfering transmissions across which the result must be averaged.
For the 5.5 Mbit high rate sequence set shown in Fig. 3 the
BER follows very closely that of the single barker sequence
employed by the BR-DSSS. In the case of the 11 Mbit/s rate
(Fig. 4) the BER impact is marginally worse, being approximately
higher than for the BR-DSSS at 6, = 0 dB.
This difference is relatively insignificant, as in either case, the
presence of an interfering frame with 6, > 0 dB will, with a
high probability, corrupt the current transmission.

-
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Fig. 2 . Correlator Output BER Experienced by Initial Frame for 2 Mbit/s
Barker spreading code
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B. Multiple Interferers

Fig. 5 illustrates the impact multiple inlerferers have on the
average BER for the BR-DSSS 1 and 2 Mbit/s rates. As the
number of interfering frames is increased, the average BER is
increased significantly.
Fig. 6 illustrates this for 11 Mbit/s with & / N o = 20 dB.
Again, as the number of interferers is increased, the BER is significantly increased. In practice, a single interferer with 6, > 2
dB will be sufficient to jam a competing hidden transmission.
These results indicate that a host may be unable to successfully access the radio channel when competing with a hidden
terminal having a marginally higher signal strength. Transmissions from any terminal are potentially jammed by the stronger
connection, making the RTSKTS handshake effective for the
strongest host only.
As stated earlier, this analysis is based on the assumption of
a BPSK modulated signal. Therefore, the results can be considered to represent an ideal case, as more complex modulation schemes require a higher signal strength at the receiver to
achieve an equal BER. Given this analysis indicates quite conclusively that the hidden terminal jamming problem is responsible for the behaviour presented in [l],analysis of differential
and quadrature modulation schemes are not considered neces-

sary.
The results presented here illustrate that an interfering frame
with a higher signal strength, arising from a hidden terminal
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8 dB

Fig. 3. Correlator Output BER Experienced by Initial Frame lor 5.5 IMbit/s
Spreading Sequence Set
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Fig. 4. Correlator Output BER Experienced by Initial Frame for 11 Mbit/s
Spreading Sequence Set

V. CONCLUSIONS

0

f

10-1

d

p 104

-

$10.
4

'

10

I

0

-2

2

4

6

8

10

6 dB

Fig. 5. Barker Code K interferers, Eb/No = 20dB
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In this paper we have presented analytical and numerical results describing the hidden terminal jamming problem present
in IEEE 802.11 ad hoc networks. We have developed specific analytical expressions describing the BER of a received
frame for the IEEE 802.11 DSSS physical layers, providing an explanation for this phenomena. Our results indicate
that a signal differential as small as 2dB is sufficient for the
stronger transmission to effectivelyjam a weaker transmission,
closely matching experimental measurements. This renders the
RTS/CTS handshake ineffective for all but the connection with
the highest signal strength. Such scenarios are likely for a
hidden terminal topology where the MAC protocol relies on
the RTS/CTS handshake to prevent hidden terminal collisions.
This leads to the conclusion that improvements are required in
the current IEEE 802.11 physical layer to prevent such multiple
access interference if it is to be used reliably in future ad hoc
network applications.
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has the potential to effectively jam the reception of a prior
frame. This phenomena is particularly likely in mobile ad hoc
networks, where hidden terminals can be expected to be common.
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